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SELECTIVE SUBSIDIARITY AND 




INTRODUCTION: TURNING THE TABLES ON/OF  SUBSIDIARITY 
Whom, not what, or which purpose—does subsidiarity serve in international 
governance? Whom does it empower? Subsidiarity, generally, is the normative 
concept whereby rules and policies are better deliberated, devised, and 
determined at lower rather than higher levels1 of authority and interest, unless 
convincing reasons exist to prefer otherwise.2 These reasons often include some 
kinds of efficiency or legitimacy considerations, or both, as determinative 
benchmarks.3 Moreover, subsidiarity is usually presumed to be an instrument 
for preserving and maintaining the influence of the local in the face of the 
increasing power of centralized, multilateral, and global institutions.4 In this 
vein, subsidiarity appears to cut overarching structures of global governance 
down to their proper size, balancing their otherwise prevailing power, while 
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 1.  “Subsidiarity” evokes vertical terminology. See generally René Urueña, Subsidiary and the 
Public–Private Distinction in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, 
at 99, 101–02. However, subsidiarity also has horizontal (inter-regime) applications. See Robert Howse 
& Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity?, 16 
GOVERNANCE 73, 75 (2005). Moreover, subsidiarity could also be perceived in spatial rather than 
linear terms. See Joel P. Trachtman, Trade and . . . Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity, 9 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 32, 34 (1998). 
 2.  This is necessarily a caricature of the breadth of subsidiarity’s forms. See Markus Jachtenfuchs 
& Nico Krisch, Subsidiarity in Global Governance, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 1; 
Andreas Føllesdal, Competing Conceptions of Subsidiarity, in NOMOS LV: FEDERALISM AND 
SUBSIDIARITY 214, 219–26 (James E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds., 2014); Isabel Feichtner, 
Subsidiarity, in 9 THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 652, 653–57 
(Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2012). Thus, for example, the default allocation of authority may differ: 
subsidiarity can either determine when authority devolves from central to local, or when authority 
reserved to the local is nevertheless reallocated to the central.  
 3.  See, e.g., Jenna Bednar, Subsidiarity and Robustness: Building the Adaptive Efficiency of 
Federal Systems, in NOMOS LV: FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY, supra note 2, at 231 (explaining 
subsidiarity in federal systems as a method of enhancing adaptive efficiency, not only general social 
welfare). 
 4.  See Jachtenfuchs & Krisch, supra note 2, at 6–7 (depicting subsidiarity as a presumption in 
favor of lower-level decisionmaking). 
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seemingly alleviating, if not curing, the democratic deficits inherent in 
international organization. In other words, the story goes, global strata of 
governance sacrifice some of their powers (actual or potential) through 
subsidiarity, empowering more localized elements (such as regional groupings, 
states, provinces, or municipalities) where the exercise of the latter’s authority 
and decision-making processes would be more effective and legitimate. 
At least when applied to the World Trade Organization (WTO)—a prime 
multilateral (indeed, almost universal)5 regime of norms and institutions, whose 
overarching purpose is to encourage states to reduce the barriers they impose 
on international trade in goods and services for mutual benefit6—this 
idealization of subsidiarity encounters some revealing difficulties and 
complications, which tell us much about the operability of subsidiarity in 
general. 
On the one hand, the WTO has no executive powers or authority 
independent of its Membership, and in practice it does not exercise formally 
binding decision-making competences beyond the adjudication of its own rules 
and the authorization of their enforcement through its much-vaunted dispute 
settlement system. Contrary to the European Union (EU) and its model of 
subsidiarity, with all of its baggage,7 the WTO, which does not engage in direct, 
positive regulation, has few effective legislative or even quasi-legislative 
procedures and hardly ever “acts” in any traditional manner. The WTO is, as is 
the truism, a “Member-driven” organization, at least in the sense that 
“Members are part of the international organization (for example, through 
rulemaking) and at the same time act outside the [international organization] 
(for example, through implementation),”8 with a heavy emphasis on consensus 
rulemaking associated with normative stagnation and institutional paralysis.9 
There is, therefore, from a somewhat positivist perspective, something 
discordant from the outset in discussing subsidiarity in the context of the WTO 
(or the WTO in the context of subsidiarity). If the paramount global trade 
regulation forum actually holds little formal authority, is the default not that all 
powers remain vested with states, subject to their political interactions within 
the organization and outside of it? How is subsidiarity, then, of any relevance? 
On the other hand, notwithstanding the paucity of formal powers over its 
 
 5.  The WTO currently has 162 Members, including 159 states and three “Separate Customs 
Territories.” See Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2015). 
 6.  This both generalizes and simplifies; for a nuanced discussion of the goals of trade agreements, 
see generally KYLE BAGWELL & ROBERT W. STAIGER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE WORLD TRADING 
SYSTEM (2002). 
 7.  See generally Paul Craig, Subsidiarity: A Political and Legal Analysis, 50 J. COMMON MKT. 
STUD. 72–87 (2012).  
 8.  See Manfred Elsig, The World Trade Organization at Work: Performance in a Member-Driven 
Milieu, 5 REV. INT’L ORG. 345, 346 (2010). 
 9.  See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Lothar Ehring, Decision-Making in the WTO: Is the Consensus 
Practice of the WTO Adequate for Making, Revising and Implementing Rules on International Trade?, 8 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 51, 53 (2005). 
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Members, the WTO is an important—to some, even a looming and 
threatening10—agent of global governance. At times, the engagement of the 
WTO dispute settlement system with (and intrusion into) significant domestic 
public policy issues that transcend mere trade flows, such as public health (for 
example, national tobacco control measures)11 or public morals (for example, 
import bans related to animal welfare),12 is sufficient testament to this. To be 
sure, this is negative power (the power to overrule), rather than positive 
authority (the power to rule), but in any case, the WTO would appear to hold 
much greater influence in practice than the law on the books would tell us. 
Thus, despite the absence of a strict ordering system or a clear normative 
hierarchy within the organization, the concept of subsidiarity may hold the 
potential for some traction in the WTO system, serving a necessary authority-
allocation function. However framed or depicted, the WTO undoubtedly 
possesses influence that interacts with the lower decision-making entities of its 
Members. Yet the default locus of power, as well as the mechanisms of 
allocation, remains unclearly defined in formal terms, and indeed contested. For 
the WTO dispute settlement organs, the point of departure is that the WTO 
Agreements prevail as the international law of the organization, whereas for 
national governments, there is a presumption of sovereignty (followed by 
continued—often feigned—astonishment when the constraints imposed at the 
international level become real). At the same time, there exists in the WTO an 
environment of legislative deferrals,13 in which many difficult normative issues 
are voluntarily, at least by omission, left by the Membership to the judicial 
branch—the dispute settlement system—to decide.14 
In these circumstances, the ultimate balance of authority, so to speak, may 
be the outcome of dynamic political reflexivities applying between the relevant 
actors—especially individual WTO Members, the Membership as a whole, the 
dispute settlement system (Panels and the Appellate Body (AB)), and, behind 
the scenes, the WTO Secretariat15—rather than any structured or otherwise 
reasoned forms of subsidiarity or mutual deference. In such cases, the 
distinction between weak and strong types of subsidiarity, depending on the 
“threshold” for rebutting the presumption in favor of the lower level of 
 
 10.  On antiglobalist concerns, see Tomer Broude, From Seattle to Occupy: The Shifting Focus of 
Social Protest, in LINKING GLOBAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: NEW POLICY SPACE IN HARD 
ECONOMIC TIMES 91–107 (Daniel Drache & Lesley A. Jacobs eds., 2014). 
 11.  See Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of 
Clove Cigarettes, ¶ 13, WTO Doc. WT/DS406/AB/R (adopted Apr. 4, 2012). 
 12.  See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation 
and Marketing of Seal Products, ¶¶ 5.194–.203, WTO Doc. WT/DS/401/AB/R (adopted May 23, 2014). 
 13.  In another context, see generally GEORGE I. LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE DEFERRALS: 
STATUTORY AMBIGUITY, JUDICIAL POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2010) (arguing that 
within American politics, lawmakers in some circumstances invite the Court to make policy decisions). 
 14.  See TOMER BROUDE, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE IN THE WTO: JUDICIAL BOUNDARIES 
AND POLITICAL CAPITULATION 34, 306 (2004). 
 15.  See Sikinah Jinna, Overlap Management in the WTO: Secretariat Influence on Trade-
Environment Politics, 10 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 54, 71–74 (2010). 
3-BROUDE INCORPORATED (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/2016  1:26 PM 
56 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 79:53 
decisionmaking, as suggested in this issue’s framing article,16 is barely 
applicable—at least to the extent that the subsidiary entities actually prefer 
decisions to be made over their heads, at the organizational level. Furthermore, 
this observation casts more than a mere shadow of doubt on the normative 
prescriptiveness of subsidiarity, at least in the WTO setting and perhaps more 
broadly. To be fair, though, in the WTO, most forms of subsidiarity-like 
mechanisms (as we shall soon see) are implied rather than explicit. In any case, 
the preference of subsidiary entities for higher-level decisionmaking also shows 
that the demand for subsidiarity17 is not a one-way street. In a multilevel system 
of governance, the lower levels might actually clamor for greater centralization, 
while at the same time the higher levels prefer (or demand) devolution. 
Having said all this, in ways that are not entirely unlike international law 
more generally,18 but compounded by particular trade-land phenomena (such as 
the malaise in multilateral rule development in the ill-fated Doha Round)19 and 
institutional competition from regional and plurilateral machinations,20 the 
WTO seems to be plagued by an existential fear of irrelevance, despite its 
unquestionable actual influence. The WTO is constantly in need of approbation 
and maintenance of its legitimacy, both internal (vis-à-vis its own Membership) 
and external (vis-à-vis international civil society, broadly construed, for 
example),21 with mixed results as far as democratic legitimation is concerned.22 
In this context, expressions of subsidiarity may be employed, not merely as 
positive means of authority allocation, but rather as discursive devices for 
managing and moderating the balance of authority and legitimacy between 
different levels of governance. Crucially, this means that subsidiarity and 
deference, ostensibly empowering subglobal decision-making authorities (such 
as at the state level), may actually legitimate and strengthen global governance 
levels. Indeed, even implicit, subsidiarity-like mechanics can contribute to the 
legitimation of governance at the central (or higher) international level without 
 
 16.  Jachtenfuchs & Krisch, supra note 2, at 7. 
 17.  See id. 
 18.  See generally Martti Koskeniemmi, The Politics of International Law, 1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 4 
(1990) (providing a critical discussion of the tension between international law’s quest for normative 
relevance and its subjection to political fiat). 
 19.  See Simon Evenett, The Doha Round Impasse: A Graphical Account, 9 REV. INT’L ORG. 143, 
144 (2014). 
 20.  Examples of such institutional competition include the proliferation of Regional Trade 
Agreements (RTAs) and the rise of “mega regionals” (the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership and the Trans-Pacific Partnership). See Thomas Cottier, The Common Law of International 
Trade and the Future of the WTO, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 3 (2015).  
 21.  See Gregory Shaffer, Manfred Elsig & Sergio Puig, The Extensive (but Fragile) Authority of the 
WTO Appellate Body, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 254; Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Rule 
of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO 
Dispute Settlement, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 191, 194–97 (2001).  
 22.  See Samantha Besson, The Democratic Legitimacy of WTO Law—On the Dangers of Fast-food 
Democracy, 22–26 (Nat’l Centres of Competence in Research, Working Paper No. 2011/72, 2011), 
http://www.nccr-trade.org/publication/the-democratic-legitimacy-of-wto-law-on-the-dangers-of-fast-
food-democracy/. 
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detracting from its social power.23 These mechanics may even enhance the social 
power of centralized international governance. The tables of subsidiarity can be 
turned, therefore, with deference serving to empower central authority no less 
than the constituent subunits, if not more so; but importantly, these exercises 
have their limits, imposed by the ongoing relations between the entities 
involved and the practical legitimacies they provide. 
As already hinted, any descriptive and critical discussion of subsidiarity in 
the WTO (as opposed to a more normative, indeed almost aspirational, study of 
WTO waivers as an instrument of subsidiarity)24 must inevitably focus on the 
organization’s dispute settlement system and its interpretation and application 
of WTO law. If at the turn of the millennium many still thought that the chief 
function of WTO dispute settlement was simply to manage EU–U.S. trade 
relations—the traditional political economy of give-and-take market access—it 
is now increasingly clear that its role, regardless of the identity of parties to 
particular disputes, is to manage the balance between trade rules (whether in 
the WTO or otherwise) on the one hand, and domestic regulatory space on the 
other hand. This is closely connected to the substantive “[t]rade and . . .” 
discourse, the debate regarding the proper role of the trade regime in 
addressing nontrade values and interests—such as environmental sustainability, 
public morals, or public health, as already mentioned—which has a horizontal 
inter-regime dimension that can also be thought of, at least metaphorically, in 
terms of subsidiarity.25 But it is much more clearly related to the allocation of 
regulatory authority along the vertical axis, or spatial plane, of the competing 
distribution of policy-making prowess between the WTO and national public 
authorities, as well as regional organizations. 
Although subsidiarity is not an enumerated principle of international (or 
WTO) law, it arguably has many functional manifestations in the WTO. Indeed, 
according to Pascal Lamy, the (European) former Director-General of the 
WTO, subsidiarity is an essential principle of global governance as a normative 
matter, and accordingly, “Policy should be allocated at the lowest level of 
government (national, regional, or global) encompassing all benefits and 
costs.”26 But given the absence of positive authority vested in the organization, 
and the focus on dispute settlement, the subsidiarity conceived of in the WTO is 
more similar to a loosely defined decision-making deference to national, or 
possibly regional, preferences and laws. 
 
 23.  “Power” here is used neither in a formal-legal sense, nor as empirical causation, STEVEN 
LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW (1974), but rather as a structural-realist concept involving “the 
capacities to act possessed by social agents in virtue of the enduring relations in which they participate.” 
Jeffrey C. Isaac, Beyond the Three Faces of Power: A Realist Critique, 20 POLITY 4, 22 (1987). For a 
discussion of this kind of power in the judicial context, see BROUDE, supra note 14, at 46–47. 
 24.  See generally Isabel Feichtner, Subsidiarity in the WTO: The Promise of Waivers, 79 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 75.  
 25.  See Howse & Nicolaïdis, supra note 1. 
 26.  Pascal Lamy, Speech at the Singapore Global Dialogue: Governance of a Multipolar World 
Order (Sept. 21, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl248_e 
.htm). 
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With all of this in mind, this article examines, from positive and descriptive 
perspectives, the actual extent of subsidiarity-like provisions and processes in 
the WTO. In so doing, the article explores the nature and distribution of the 
WTO’s operation. In a nutshell, the critical argument is that the (surprisingly 
abundant) expressions of subsidiarity (or deference) in the WTO are selective 
and strategic, not systemic, and that they more often than not serve to 
counteract the anxieties of the multilateral decision-making machinery, 
providing it with sources of enhanced legitimacy in its give-and-take with other 
actors (the Membership in particular) over influence and governance. 
Simultaneously, this selective subsidiarity does not clearly work to either 
empower or disempower national (or regional) systems, and it is in this respect 
that the deference becomes dialectical. This is how subsidiarity in action in the 
WTO should be understood—not as a technical authority-allocation rule, but as 
range of instruments and vocabularies through which the apportionment of 
authority is negotiated and adjusted through the discursive device that 
subsidiarity thus understood becomes. 
Part II shows a small variety of elements of subsidiarity in the WTO’s 
substantive norms. Some of these elements are interpretative in nature, 
including the interpretation of particular terms in the WTO agreements; in 
trade in goods and services; as well as in environmental, public health, public 
morals, and security exceptions, while others are more allocative,27 such as the 
construction of specific liberalization commitments in the WTO’s General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Part III demonstrates dialectic 
dimensions of deference in some of the WTO’s procedural rules, which include 
the “as such”/”as applied” complaint divide, the standard of review in dispute 
settlement, the choice of means of compliance following dispute settlement, and 
the relationship with trade agreements outside the WTO (all as discussed in this 
part). Part IV concludes with thoughts on the dualities of subsidiarity in 
international governance. 
II 
SEEKING SUBSIDIARITY IN THE WTO’S SUBSTANTIVE NORMS 
Subsidiarity and deference have numerous expressions in the substantive 
law of the WTO. The following is just a sketch of some of these, which 
demonstrates these expressions can (and do) also work to strengthen and 
empower the supposedly higher or central WTO domain, rather than Members’ 
decisionmaking, contrary to the conventional logic of subsidiarity. The focus is 
largely on the interpretation as well as on the creation of some of the rules that 
regulate the interface between trade liberalization and domestic regulatory 
autonomy, and elements of this counterintuitive dynamic can be detected in 
other significant areas of WTO law as well.28 
 
 27.  For the distinction between interpretative and allocative subsidiarity, see Jachtenfuchs & 
Krisch, supra note 2, at 10, 20–21. 
 28.   For examples of this dynamic, see Agreement on the Technical Barriers to Trade, Jan. 1, 1995, 
3-BROUDE INCORPORATED (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/2016  1:26 PM 
No. 2 2016] SELECTIVE SUBSIDIARITY AND DIALECTIC DEFERENCE 59 
In passing, the interchangeability of subsidiarity and deference is not self-
evident. Subsidiarity, strictly speaking, may be understood as a rule (however 
fuzzy) that governs the allocation of authority, with a preference for the local or 
lower levels of decisionmaking. In contrast, deference is a voluntary yet 
respectful submission to the authority of the other.29 In many respects, the 
implicit subsidiarity referred to here has much in common with deference in the 
softer normative sense, as it derives from (and forms) the enduring relations 
between actors, and as already noted, is not based on a reasoned or structured 
norm. Having noted that, for the purposes of this article the two terms are 
treated as mutually substitutable. 
A. The Interpretative Structure of GATT and GATS General Exceptions 
The all-important Article XX GATT (and its services corollary, Article XIV 
GATS)—the general exceptions clause—acts as a central axis in managing the 
balance between WTO trade rules and domestic regulatory space, as well as in 
determining the degree of deference accorded to WTO Members’ assessments 
of their own regulatory needs in a broad range of public policy areas, such as 
the protection of public morals; human, animal, or plant life or health; and the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources.30 The text of Article XX GATT 
has provided fertile ground for intricate, and at times controversial, 
hermeneutical discussions between Members and between them and the dispute 
settlement system. These include, perhaps most saliently, the interpretation of 
the term “necessary to” that appears in several of the subclauses of the 
provision.31 This is the so-called “necessity test,” which contrasts with the use of 
the term “related to” present in the other subclauses of Article XX GATT. 
When is a measure necessary to protect human health or public morals? As 
interpreted in WTO jurisprudence, this question has certainly evolved into an 
instrument of subsidiarity. 
The classic EC–Asbestos32 dispute is instructive in this respect. Canada 
complained against an absolute ban applied by France with respect to all 
 
1868 U.N.T.S. 120, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, Jan. 1, 1995, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3, and 
to a lesser extent, TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
299. 
 29.  See generally PHILIP SOPER, THE ETHICS OF DEFERENCE: LEARNING FROM LAW’S MORALS 
(2002) (developing a theory of law based on a moral duty to defer, as distinguished from a duty to obey 
or to conform). 
 30.  The general exceptions in Article XX GATT constitute an exhaustive list of public-policy 
justifications for divergence from GATT obligations. See FEDERICO ORTINO, BASIC LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTS FOR THE LIBERALISATION OF TRADE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EC AND WTO 
LAW 120 (2004). 
 31.  See Andrew Mitchell & Caroline Henckels, Variations on a Theme: Comparing the Concept of 
“Necessity” in International Investment Law and WTO Law, 14 CHI. J. INT’L L. 93, 123–29 (2013).  
 32.  See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos Containing Products, ¶¶ 164–175, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2001). This, 
and other cases discussed in this article, while not recent, reflect the dilemmas of deference that have 
not changed significantly.  
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asbestos products due to their carcinogenic qualities. Canada argued, among 
other things, that the “level of protection” sought by France was questionable, 
and that there were reasonably available, less trade-restrictive measures for 
achieving adequate protection from asbestos-related risks.33 In its Report (in 
essence, a judicial decision—the WTO dispute settlement system is more than 
functionally an international tribunal), the AB stated in no uncertain terms that 
“it is undisputed that WTO Members have the right to determine the level of 
protection of health that they consider appropriate in a given situation,”34 and 
that “France could not reasonably be expected to employ any alternative 
measure if that measure would involve a continuation of the very risk that the 
Decree seeks to ‘halt.’”35 
Surely, both legs of this decision reflect a highly deferential approach. In 
subsidiarity terms, this is an interpretation that leaves to the supposedly lower 
(that is, WTO Member) decision-making authority the power to determine the 
appropriate level of protection36 accorded to the public policy concern that is a 
justification for WTO inconsistency—which in turn serves as a central factor for 
assessing the reasonableness of purportedly alternative measures. As far as the 
examination of specific public policy exceptions is concerned, the WTO dispute 
settlement system has proved extremely deferential to Members invoking them, 
in two cases even accepting China’s censorship system as supporting public 
morals, without question.37 The very definition of public morals—as adopted by 
the AB in U.S.–Gambling,38 in which U.S. restrictions on Internet gambling 
services were challenged by the small Caribbean island state of Antigua and 
Barbuda, and recently confirmed in EC–Seals,39 in which EU prohibitions on 
the sale of products derived from seal hunting, which involves great suffering to 
the hunted animals, were at issue—is highly deferential, avoiding the 
establishment of some kind of central or higher image of morality. The AB has  
 
 
 33.  Id. ¶ 165.  
 34.  Id. ¶ 168. 
 35.  Id. ¶ 174. 
 36.  Similar expressions appear more explicitly in the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and 
Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade. “Appropriate Level of Protection” is more properly a 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures term, clearly envisioned as being determined by the Member. See 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, pmbl., art. 4.1, Apr. 4, 1994. This is echoed by the 
Sixth Preambular Recital Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade: “[N]o country should be 
prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure the quality of its exports, or for the protection of 
human, animal or plant life or health, of the environment, or for the prevention of deceptive practices, 
at the levels it considers appropriate” (emphasis added). See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
pmbl., art. 6, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120. 
 37. See Tomer Broude & Holger P. Hestermeyer, The First Condition of Progress? Freedom of 
Speech and the Limits of International Trade Law, VA. J. INT’L L. 295, 314–17 (2014). 
 38. Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and 
Betting Services, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/R (adopted Nov. 10, 2004); Appellate Body Report, United 
States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 296, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS285/AB/R  (adopted Apr. 7, 2005).  
 39. LOVELL, supra note 13. 
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determined that “the term ‘public morals’ denotes standards of right and wrong 
conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation.”40 
This is hardly, however, the end of the story. Deference to the public policy 
goal as assessed by the respondent Member does not automatically mean that 
its measure will be justified by the relevant exception and accepted by the 
dispute settlement system. There are other obstacles to be surmounted, in 
particular the terms of the celebrated chapeau of Article XX GATT (emulated 
in Article XIV GATS).41 The chapeau subjects any claim of exceptionality to 
requirements of an absence of “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” or a 
“disguised restriction on international trade.” The record shows that these 
elements of the chapeau are an extremely difficult hurdle to jump—out of a few 
dozen disputes in which general exceptions have been invoked, only one or two 
(depending on one’s reading) have traversed the chapeau successfully. This is an 
empiric that has even recently been seized upon by opponents of new 
international trade agreements (such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership), as a 
demonstration of the lack of deference in the WTO and trade law more 
generally.42 
Subsidiarity and deference may therefore be, in practice, significantly 
curtailed by the strictness of the chapeau. The hand that defers—by recognizing 
the Members’ right to regulate and their autonomy to determine appropriate 
goals of protection—easily taketh away by finding some otherwise unjustifiable 
flaw in the measure at issue. Indeed, this might even be perceived as faux 
deference to the extent that the negative power to strike down national 
measures is retained and unflinchingly employed by the higher WTO dispute 
settlement authority. The public policy consideration is accepted as vital—
public morals in U.S.–Gambling and U.S.–Seals, public health in other cases—
but the method of implementation is still subject to review, and it almost always 
fails. 
However, a more careful reading of the cases reveals the full dialectic of 
subsidiarity. The reasons why a measure does not satisfy the terms of the 
chapeau do not negate the underlying deference to the justification of the 
measure, and they are usually not so difficult to subsequently rectify through a 
process of trial, error, and inter-institutional negotiation. This is why in EC–
Seals, as but one example, the EU celebrated the AB’s recognition of animal 
welfare as justifiable under the public-morals exception in Article XX(a) 
 
 40. Appellate Body Report, US—Gambling, ¶¶ 296–298; Panel Report, US—Gambling, ¶ 6.46 
(emphasis added). 
 41. For a recent, incisive analysis, see generally Lorand Bartels, The Chapeau of the General 
Exceptions in the GATT and GATS Agreements: A Reconstruction, 109 AM. J.  INT’L L. 95 (2015) 
(meticulously examining each element of the chapeau).  
 42. See, e.g., Only One of 40 Attempts to Use the GATT Article XX/GATS Article XIV “General 
Exception” Has Ever Succeeded: Replicating the WTO Exception Construct Will Not Provide for an 
Effective TPP General Exception, PUBLIC CITIZEN (Aug. 2015), https://www.citizen.org/documents/ 
general-exception.pdf (providing evidence of the ineffectiveness of the GATT Article XX and GATS 
Article XIV).  
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GATT, even though its measure had failed the chapeau test. The faults the AB 
found in the measure could be cured “with some modifications that would 
amount to gestures of good faith,” as some commentators have noted.43 The 
same could be said about many of the other cases in which the chapeau 
requirements have not been satisfied. Has subsidiarity not been reinstated, 
then? 
Rather than drawing a bright line—or at least reasoned and structured 
degrees of deference—this discussion demonstrates that subsidiarity and 
deference are far from binary concepts. Through Article XX, the WTO defers 
to lower-level decisions, and then finds fault in them, but the flaws are rarely 
fatal. Who, then, does subsidiarity empower? Arguably, it empowers both the 
higher and lower actors. As a result, the regulatory space of states is only 
minimally restricted, but in the process, this space is subjected to the overruling 
power of WTO dispute settlement scrutiny. 
This dialectic structure is not accidental, but it is rather the offshoot of 
deliberate interpretative choices made by the AB. For example, in the 
formative years of its influence and legitimation, particularly in the seminal 
U.S.–Shrimp case,44 the WTO AB addressed the seemingly formalistic question 
of how to sequence the analysis of a national measure’s conformity with the 
Article XX GATT chapeau and the enumerated categories of issue-area 
exceptions. Should the national measure under review first be evaluated under 
the general terms of the chapeau, and only then be assessed in relation to one of 
the explicitly enumerated public-policy justifications, or vice versa? The U.S.–
Shrimp Panel considered the U.S. environmental measure first under the 
chapeau, in effect striking the entire measure down in the abstract,45 
emphasizing its trade impact, without looking into the substantive applications 
of the measure relating to animal life and exhaustible natural resources.46 This 
approach left little scope for recognition of national, subsidiary concerns. The 
AB, in contrast, found the Panel to be in error, reversing the sequence of 
analysis.47 The measure should first be judged by whether it conforms to one of 




 43. See Robert Howse, Joanna Langille & Katie Sykes, Sealing the Deal: The WTO’s Appellate 
Body Report in EC–Seal Products, 18 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS (June 4, 2014), 
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/12/sealing-deal-wto%E2%80%99s-appellate-body-report-
ec-%E2%80%93-seal-products. Indeed, commentators posit that the AB approach to public morals is 
appropriately deferential to the pluralism of WTO Members’ public morals. See Robert Howse, Joanna 
Langille & Katie Sykes, Pluralism in Practice: Moral Legislation and the Law of the WTO After Seal 
Products, GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 2, 66–68 (2015).  
 44. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, ¶¶ 125–186, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998). 
 45.  Panel Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 
7.29, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/R (adopted May 15, 1998). 
 46.  Id. ¶ 7.63. 
 47.  Appellate Body Report, US—Shrimp, ¶ 117. 
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This order of analysis has hardly been questioned since the AB’s 
determination.48 It has been adopted in the GATS as well,49 and can therefore 
be taken as a (technical) canon of WTO law. Importantly, it is this 
interpretative move that has allowed the WTO dispute settlement system, when 
faced with Article XX GATT (and similar) arguments, to project deference by 
embracing the policy goals of Members, subject to the strict terms of the 
chapeau, while simultaneously leaving sufficient room to maneuver among the 
technicalities of removing the causes of “arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination” or a “disguised restriction on international trade.”50  This effect 
both increases the legitimacy of the WTO and its dispute settlement system 
without visibly detracting from its powerful oversight and influence, and 
provides Members with adequate, negotiated policy space. 
In other words, subsidiarity and deference have served the higher level of 
decisionmaking no less, if not more, than the lower levels, by staking out a field 
of deliberation and negotiation whose ground rules are established by the WTO 
dispute settlement system, but require the satisfaction of the participating 
Members—therefore granting them in practice greater autonomy than the eye 
might see at first. To be sure, this discussion of Article XX GATT is merely one 
dimension in a much wider scheme of interpretative balancing between WTO 
trade rules and dispute settlement authority on the one hand, and Members’ 
regulatory autonomy on the other. Similar dilemmas and interpretative 
decisions have been manifested in the Agreements on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (such as the “legitimate regulatory distinction” issue) and the Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures (such as the “appropriate level of protection,” and 
deference to scientific risk assessments conducted by a Member).51 Although it 
is not possible to address meaningfully these additional dimensions here, they 
all present a similar pattern of dialectic deference that enhances the WTO’s 
centrality while acknowledging states’ decision-making authorities. 
B. The Strange Case of Security Exceptions 
An interesting outlier in comparison with the general Article XX GATT and 
Article XIV GATS exceptions discussed above, but nevertheless an example of 
selective—and negotiated rather than reasoned—subsidiarity and dialectic 
deference, are the security exceptions under Article XXI GATT and Article 
XIV bis GATS. According to these provisions, exceptions to trade rules can be 
made regarding several prescribed security-related circumstances. Thus, a 
Member may refrain from disclosing information it considers to be contrary to 
its essential security interests; a Member is not prevented by the agreements 
 
 48.  But see Bartels, supra note 41 (raising arguments in favor of a contrary order of analysis). 
 49.  As in the first case in which Article XIV GATS was invoked. See Panel Report, US—
Gambling, ¶¶ 6.438–7.5. 
 50.  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Art. XX, Apr. 15, 1994. 
 51.  See Michael Ming Du, The Rise of National Regulatory Autonomy in the GATT/WTO Regime, 
14 J. INT’L ECON. L. 639, 651–52 (2011). 
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from taking action it considers necessary for the protection of its essential 
security interests (relating to fissionable material, traffic in arms, ammunition 
and implements of war, or more generally, in time of war or other emergency in 
international relations); and a Member is not prevented by trade obligations 
from taking any action in pursuance of its “obligations under the United 
Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.” 
These broad exceptions have in practice become—at least so far—
significantly deferential. In a 1949 dispute regarding Cold War export 
restrictions imposed by the United States vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia, a majority of 
involved GATT Contracting Parties unsurprisingly supported the U.S. position 
that the measures were justified for national-security reasons.52 The very 
subjection of the security consideration to higher scrutiny may suggest a lack of 
deference, but the decision itself was clearly entirely political and, consequently, 
highly deferential. Subsequently—almost forty years later, and after very few 
invocations of the exception—a 1986 GATT Panel, called to adjudicate a late 
Cold War dispute between the United States and Nicaragua, rejected U.S. 
claims that the applicability of the security exception is at the exclusive 
discretion of parties, by the logic that 
[i]f it were accepted that the interpretation of Article XXI was reserved entirely to the 
contracting party invoking it, how could the CONTRACTING PARTIES ensure that 
this general exception to all obligations under the General Agreement is not invoked 
excessively or for purposes other than those set out in this provision?53 
Under the procedural rules that applied in the old GATT system, this Panel 
Report was essentially vetoed by the United States, and not adopted. Ever since 
then, security exceptions have de facto, though not de jure, been considered, 
especially by the United States, to be “self-judging,” essentially—under this 
interpretation, which is not without controversy—a full-blown form of 
deference and subsidiarity.54 But at the same time, this hardly tells us much, as 
Members have by and large displayed hesitation, if not absolute reluctance, in 
either lodging complaints that may involve security concerns or invoking them 
as justifications for WTO-inconsistent measures. As one commentator has 
noted, “[I]n over sixty years of international trade, invocations of the security 
exception have only been challenged a handful of times, and those challenges 
have never resulted in a binding GATT/WTO decision.”55 Of course, Panels and 
the AB cannot discuss security exceptions sua sponte (of their own accord), and  
 
 
 52.  See Summary Record of the Twenty-Second Meeting (June 8, 1949), GATT BISD CP.3/SR22 - 
II/28. 
 53.  Report of the Panel, United States—Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, ¶ 5.17 GATT Doc. 
L/6053 (not adopted Oct. 13, 1986). 
 54.  For a more complete, yet noncritical, account of the practice of security exceptions generally 
endorsing the (quite exclusively) U.S. position on this matter, see generally Roger Paul Alford, The 
Self-Judging WTO Security Exception, 3 UTAH L. REV. 697 (2011). See also Dapo Akande & Sope 
Williams, International Adjudication on National Security Issues: What Role for the WTO?, 43 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 365 (2003). 
 55.  Alford, supra note 54, at 699. 
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so this would appear to have in practice removed security issues entirely from 
the ambit of the WTO. 
Another view, however, is that WTO Members are well aware, and wary, of 
the (now, but not permanently, latent) power wielded, however cautiously, by a 
WTO dispute settlement system. This power cannot be vetoed if the self-
proclaimed “self-judging” nature of security exceptions were actually tried and 
tested (perhaps overturned and refuted) by the central judicial authority of the 
WTO. This is, therefore, not real subsidiarity or deference, but rather a 
normative no-man’s-land, to be left for future judicial negotiation, and it is only 
a matter of time until the security exceptions enter the WTO jurisprudential 
field again. As the Membership of the WTO approaches universality, and new 
conflicts emerge (such as between Russia and Ukraine),56 the continuation of 
the traditionally depoliticized nature of the WTO57 cannot be taken for granted. 
The point here is that the actual reach of subsidiarity depends on the continued 
practice of both the higher and lower actors on a vertical plane, rather than on a 
clearly defined line of authority allocation. 
C. The Design Architecture of Specific Commitments in the GATS 
As another example of dialectic deference in substantive issues, even more 
relevant to the negotiation and creation of commitments than merely to their 
interpretation, consider the concept of GATS-specific commitments, in 
particular the negotiation modality of “positive listing.” The potentially 
consequential services trade liberalization commitments of Market Access 
(Article XVI GATS) and National Treatment (Article XVII GATS), as well as 
elements of Domestic Regulation disciplines (Article VI GATS), apply only in 
those sectors (for example, financial services, accounting services, and 
telecommunications services) in which a Member has assumed such obligations 
through explicit enumeration in its schedule of commitments, and subject to 
whatever limitations listed.58 This should not be reduced merely to an 
expression of consent to be bound as a general matter, but should rather be 
understood as an important manifestation of functional subsidiarity in the 
design architecture of a central substantive pillar of the WTO. 
In the Uruguay Round GATT negotiations on trade in services, parties were 
not required to liberalize services across the board; instead, they were given the 
greater flexibility to opt in to liberalization in sectors of their choice, subject, of 
 
 56.  See Elena Klonitskaya, Is the WTO the Right Forum to Hear National Security Issues?, 9 
GLOBAL TRADE CUSTOMS J. 508, 508–11 (2014). 
 57.  See Arie Reich, The Threat of Politicization of the WTO, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 779, 788–
98 (2005). 
 58.  For analyses of “negative/positive” listings in services, see Tomer Broude & Shai Moses, The 
Behavioral Dynamics of Positive and Negative Listing in Services Trade Liberalization: A Look at the 
Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) Negotiations, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON TRADE IN SERVICES 
(forthcoming 2016); Rudolf Adlung & Hamid Mamdouh, How to Design Trade Agreements in Services: 
Top Down or Bottom Up? 1–18 (WTO Staff Working Paper, No. ERSD-2013-08, 2013), http://hdl. 
handle.net/10419/80065. 
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course, to negotiations and the mutual acceptability of these “concessions” 
among the parties. Accordingly, in sectors and modes of supply that were (and 
still are) politically sensitive in the domestic sphere—and hence worthy of such 
deference—states have chosen to refrain from liberalization. They accordingly 
retained their unfettered right to exclude foreign service providers or to 
discriminate against them, although still subject to a set of general 
commitments, such as Most-Favored Nation treatment and transparency. Thus, 
for example, the vast majority of Members have not undertaken commitments 
under Mode 4, relating to the temporary movement of natural persons (that is, 
services provision through labor migration), nor, in any mode of supply, with 
respect to health and social services.59 
The positive listing of specific commitments therefore leaves the decision to 
liberalize at a (negotiated) sub-WTO national decision-making level. Hence it is 
referred to, sometimes, as a bottom-up approach, and ostensibly provides WTO 
Members with significant precommitment policy space similar to subsidiarity. 
The choice of services sectors in which a Member would be willing to liberalize 
has been left to that Member rather than made in a centralized, top-down, 
manner, although the Member remains subject to political negotiation pressures 
from other Members. In theory, Members could choose to expand their specific 
commitments to other sectors after the conclusion of GATS negotiations, 
although this has rarely happened, and the perpetuation of the positive, list-
specific commitment approach in the Doha Round has not proved successful.60 
There is a flipside, however, to this structural subsidiarity. Once a specific 
commitment has been made, WTO practice and jurisprudence can take it very 
seriously, ultimately seizing full, albeit deliberative and negotiated, control over 
its interpretation and enforcement. The rigidity of specific commitments is built 
in; under Article XXI GATS, a Member may not modify or withdraw a specific 
commitment without compensatory adjustments vis-à-vis affected Members, 
based on either negotiation or arbitration. 
The most salient case in point is the U.S.–Gambling dispute discussed above 
in the context of the public morals exception.61 In that case, regarding the claim 
that it was in violation of its obligations, the United States emphatically denied 
that it had made specific market-access commitments relating to remote 
gambling services. In doing so, however, the United States employed the rules 
of interpretation of international law in general and the WTO in particular,62 




 59.  See Rudolf Adlung, The GATS Negotiations: Implications for Health and Social Services, 38 
INTERECONOMICS 147, 147–49 (2003). 
 60.  In regional and plurilateral agreements, more elaborate listing approaches have been pursued. 
See Broude & Moses, supra note 58, at 17. 
 61.  Panel Report, US—Gambling. 
 62.  Id. ¶¶ 3.40–.47. 
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A different approach, only barely detectable in the arguments, would have 
been to claim that the WTO should defer, at least to some extent, to a 
Member’s own understanding of its schedule of commitments. Both the Panel 
and the AB address this proposed window of subsidiarity negatively. Relying on 
earlier jurisprudence relating to the interpretation of GATT tariff schedules, 
the Panel inferred that the GATS schedules of commitments reflect the 
“common intention” of WTO Members, and that their meaning cannot be made 
“dependant [sic] on the subjective and unilateral interpretation of the United 
States.”63 In its discussion, the AB seemed to take this objectivity almost for 
granted.64 Subsequently, both the Panel and the AB, although for different 
interpretative reasons, were not persuaded by the U.S. argument for greater 
respect for subjective understandings of what a Member had intended to 
become obligated to, finding instead that a commitment had indeed been 
made,65 with all the normative weight according to it under the rules of the 
GATS game. Thus, even in the creation of commitments, subsidiarity may 
reign, but not supreme—by analogy to the “touch-move” rule in chess, decision-
making autonomy can disintegrate very quickly once a decision appears to have 
been made. 
This element of U.S.–Gambling can surely be understood as constituting a 
negative incentive to future liberalization, and in this sense, perhaps has 
weakened the ability of the WTO to generate new specific commitments, but 
that is not our concern here. Rather, the point is that the formal subsidiarity of 
the precommitment decision to liberalize has not translated into 
postcommitment deference regarding the interpretation of the scope of the 
commitment. 
III 
WTO PROCEDURAL AND INTERPRETATIVE RULES AS REFLECTIONS OF 
SUBSIDIARITY 
A dialectic of deference—in the sense that subsidiarity exists, but as a 
negotiated tension between Members’ preferences and central WTO trends that 
are sometimes empowered by it—can also be detected in interpretative choices 
made by the WTO dispute settlement system in a range of procedural and 
interpretative scenarios. These seemingly technical and formal issues are 
actually important switches in the management of subsidiarity and deference, as 
well as in crafting a balance between trade liberalization and domestic 
regulatory autonomy. Their use in the production and justification of outcomes 
imparts significant effects both on the legitimacy of substantive decisions, and 
on the relative power of the high and low levels of decisionmaking, keeping in 
mind that “substance and procedure must be distinguished to make analytical 
 
 63.  Id. ¶ 4.9.  
 64.  Appellate Body Report, US—Gambling, ¶ 159.  
 65.  See Federico Ortino, Treaty Interpretation and the WTO Appellate Body Report in United 
States—Gambling: A Critique, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 117, 119 (2006). 
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and normative sense, but at the same time they must be seen in conjunction to 
understand the protection of global public goods in international law.”66 The 
following is a series of necessarily perfunctory expositions of three of these 
interpretative and procedural questions. 
A. The “As Such”/“As Applied” and “Mandatory/Discretionary” Distinctions 
GATT and WTO jurisprudence have for more than a quarter of a century67 
grappled with the treatment of domestic (that is, national) legislation that as 
stated on the books may contain inconsistencies with WTO obligations. These 
inconsistencies, considered violations “as such,” are distinct from specific and 
concrete instances of breach, which are known as “as applied” violations.68 
Subsidiarity would suggest that a Member is free to adopt laws granting its 
executive and administrative agencies as much freedom as it sees fit, so long as 
they do not take actual actions that violate WTO commitments.69 Such an 
approach would have the effect of excluding entirely “as such” claims from the 
ambit of WTO dispute settlement. There may be, however, good reasons to 
allow “as such” claims, detached from specific violations (or semi-detached). 
“As such” challenges may include cases in which a Member challenges a 
consistently continued practice of another Member,70 such as the chilling effect 
of a potentially trade-restrictive statute even if it is not applied, or the 
cumulative litigation costs of challenging repeated specific measures (including 
evidentiary costs) instead of the statutory root cause of the violation. “As such” 
claims are therefore indisputably allowed in the WTO.71 However, for 
deferential reasons, these claims are considered “serious challenges” and 
require a higher standard of proof in comparison to claims of actual violation 
“as applied.”72 This seems to show a more generous level of respect to states’  
 
 
 66.  André Nollkaemper, International Adjudication of Global Public Goods: The Intersection of 
Substance and Procedure, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 769, 791 (2012). 
 67.  Evidence from this grappling stems from the 1988 Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act dispute. See Panel Report, United States—Taxes on Petroleum and Related 
Substances, ¶ 5.1.1 WTO Doc. L/6175–34S/136 (adopted June 17, 1987). For one review of the case and 
subsequent development, see Alan O. Sykes, An Economic Perspective on As Such/Facial versus As 
Applied Challenges in the WTO and U.S. Constitutional Systems, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 4–10 (2014). 
 68.  These distinctions have garnered considerable scholarly interest. See Simon Lester, A 
Framework for Thinking about the ‘Discretion’ in the Mandatory/Discretionary Distinction, 14 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 369, 372 (2011). 
 69.  “As such” claims have been called a “deference tool.” See Jing Kang, The Presumption of 
Good Faith in the WTO ‘As Such’ Cases: A Reformulation of the Mandatory/Discretionary Distinction 
as an Analytical Tool, 46 J. WORLD TRADE 879, 880 (2012). 
 70.  See Panel Report, United States—Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing 
Methodology, ¶ 2.1, WTO Doc. WT/DS350/R (adopted Feb. 19, 2009) (disputing the continued 
application by the United States of anti-dumping duties), as modified by AB Report WT/DS350/AB/R. 
 71.  Appellate Body Report, United States—Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, ¶ 60, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS136/AB/R (adopted Aug. 28, 2000) (recognizing that Members may “challenge legislation as 
such, independently from the application of that legislation in specific instances”).  
 72.  Appellate Body Report, United States—Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil 
Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, ¶ 172, WTO Doc. WT/DS268/AB/R (adopted Nov. 29, 2004). 
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policy space, but at the same time leaves a high degree of discretion to WTO 
adjudicators, with plenty of room for strategic selectiveness. 
“As such” claims can reach the peak of potential intrusiveness in special 
cases when they target national legislation that does not mandate action that 
violates WTO obligations (even in particular circumstances) but nevertheless 
somehow grants administrative agencies the (domestic) power to infringe upon 
WTO rules at their discretion—the so-called “mandatory/discretionary” 
distinction.73 The old GATT approach avoided scrutiny of discretionary 
legislation,74 but an important (not appealed) WTO Panel Report brilliantly 
unpacked this as an analytical fallacy,75 demonstrating that discretionary 
legislation might in itself be a violation of WTO rules. This stricter, more 
nuanced approach has largely been adopted by the AB.76 
Thus, although a semblance of subsidiarity is maintained by the “as 
such”/”as applied” and “mandatory/discretionary” distinctions, the powers of 
judicial review have been bolstered. Indeed, the U.S.–Section 301 Panel found 
that potential for a statutory authorization to breach WTO obligations was a 
violation in itself, saved only by a valid executive commitment (a U.S. 
“Statement of Administrative Action”) to refrain from committing violations.77 
This exemplifies dialectic deference: speaking the language of subsidiarity—so 
long as the WTO line is toed—all the while wielding the stick of supremacy. 
B. The Standard of Review in WTO Law 
The standard of review—the depth and intensity of scrutiny applied by the 
dispute settlement system to national measures—is a central procedural 
mechanism for regulating subsidiarity in the WTO, as a normative valve that 
distinguishes between central and domestic regulatory autonomy.78 The term 
“standard of review” does not actually appear in the WTO agreements, instead 
evolving jurisprudentially, yet it has been referred to as “a deliberate allocation 
of vertical power between WTO adjudicating bodies and national authorities to 
decide upon factual and legal issues,”79 and it may therefore be thought of as 
 
 73.  See Nicolas Lockhart & Elizabeth Sheargold, In Search of Relevant Discretion: The Role of the 
Mandatory/Discretionary Distinction in WTO Law, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 379, 380 (2010). 
 74.  See Report of the Panel, United States—Measures Affecting the Importation, Internal Sale and 
Use of Tobacco, ¶ 118, BISD 41S/131 (Oct. 4, 1994). 
 75.  See Panel Report, WT/DS152/R, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act 1974, ¶ 7.97 
n. 675, WTO Doc. WT/DS152/R (adopted Jan. 25, 2000) (“It could not be presumed, in our view, that 
the WTO would never prohibit legislation under which a national administration would enjoy certain 
discretionary powers.”). 
 76.  See Appellate Body Report, United States–Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on 
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan, ¶ 88, WTO Doc. WT/DS244/AB/R 
(adopted Jan. 9, 2004). 
 77.  See Appellate Body Report, US—Sections 301–310, ¶¶ 7.109–.126. 
 78.  For an early exploration, see generally Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute 
Procedures Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 193 (1996) 
(analyzing the standard of review in regard to the Anti-Dumping Agreement in Article 17.6 of the 
Uruguay Round texts). 
 79.  Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in WTO Dispute Resolution, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 635, 635 
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similar to other judicial forms of deference, such as the margin of appreciation.80 
However, beyond the very constrained and specific terms of Article 17.6 of the 
WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement,81 the formulation of the general standard 
under which WTO Panels and the AB review national decisions in relation to 
WTO rules has proven elusive.82 Recourse is normally made to Article 11 of the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), whereby “a panel should make an 
objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment 
of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant 
covered agreements . . . ,”83 but the vagueness of this clause provides only a 
vestige of systematicity. The jurisprudence has not endeavored to establish clear 
criteria for reviewing national measures, to the point that the adjudicators can 
seemingly choose when and to what extent to intervene. In practice, 
comprehensive analysis has shown that the standard of review tends to be quite 
intrusive,84 at times even amounting to de novo review of national decisions and 
determinations. The AB has not hesitated to reproach Panels when in its view 
they proved too deferential to national authorities.85 
The standard of review, therefore, although seemingly a legal mechanism 
for structuring subsidiarity and deference that in principle should empower 
lower decision-making levels, is rather a very fuzzy concept in which allocations 
of authority can be negotiated in a judicial environment that actually leaves the 
final word to the central or higher level of WTO adjudicators.86 
 
(2003).  
 80.  See generally Andreas Føllesdal, Subsidiarity and International Human-Rights Courts: 
Respecting Self-Governance and Protecting Human Rights—or Neither?, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,  
no. 2, 2016, at 147 (referring to the margin of appreciation in international human-rights tribunals as 
subsidiarity); DEFERENCE IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: STANDARD OF REVIEW 
AND MARGIN OF APPRECIATION (Lukasz Gruszynski & Wouter Werner eds., 2014) (examining 
margin of appreciation in various international law contexts); Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin 
of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907 (2006) (evaluating the margin 
of appreciation doctrine in recent International Court of Justice decisions). 
 81.  This provision is the only premeditated standard of review in the WTO, with very limited 
reach. The AB has held that it is irrelevant beyond anti-dumping, even with respect to closely related 
countervailing duty determinations. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Imposition of 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in 
the United Kingdom, ¶ 49, WTO Doc. WTO/DS138/R (May 10, 2000). 
 82.  See ROSS BECROFT, THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: CRITIQUE 
AND DEVELOPMENT (Edward Elgar ed., 2012). 
 83.  Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 11, Apr. 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 
[hereinafter DSU]. 
 84.  See Oesch, supra note 79. But see Michael Ioannidis, Beyond the Standard of Review: 
Deference Criteria in WTO Law and the Case for a Procedural Approach, in DEFERENCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, supra note 80, at 91.  
 85.  See Appellate Body Report, United States—Investigation of the International Trade 
Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada, ¶ 130, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS277/AB/RW (adopted Apr. 13, 2006). 
 86.  The burden of proof is another procedural vehicle of selective subsidiarity. In the WTO it has 
vacillated in different directions, selectively serving the legitimation ends of particular cases. This has 
hinged on the technical—and logically faulted—classification of a claim as a rule or an exception. See 
Tomer Broude, Genetically Modified Rules: The Awkward Rule-Exception-Right Distinction in EC—
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C. The Flexibility toward WTO Members’ Choice of Compliance Measures 
Yet another procedural expression of subsidiarity in the WTO is the way in 
which the DSU relates to the range of steps a Member may take in situations 
where its measures have been found by a Panel or the AB, or both, to be WTO-
inconsistent. Under Article 19.1 of the DSU Panels and the AB shall (merely) 
recommend that a Member bring its measure “into conformity,” and may 
“suggest ways” to do so.87 In practice, such substantive suggestions are rarely 
made,88 and adjudicators avoid making them even when requested to do so 
explicitly by a complainant.89 Moreover, even when suggestions are made, the 
Member is not duty-bound to pursue them.90 In short, the WTO dispute 
settlement does not dictate to Members precisely which means to take in order 
to secure compliance. This would appear to leave a lot of policy space—the 
discretion to choose the modality of compliance—to Members, as an expression 
of deference or subsidiarity. Of course, actual measures taken to comply may be 
subject to renewed review if they are challenged under Article 21.5 compliance 
panel procedures.91 When that occurs, the benchmark for adjudication is 
compliance with the WTO Covered Agreements, not with the conclusions of 
the original Panel/AB proceedings, even if suggestions were made.92 
Having said that, this deference is far from absolute, and the dispute 
settlement system has developed means of effectively signaling to Members 
which methods of compliance would be acceptable. Most noticeably—although 
subtly so—the AB in particular has proven adept at crafting its legal analysis in 
ways that indicate to the infringing Member what would be required in 
amended legislation for a measure to survive subsequent scrutiny.93 Thus, one 
might argue that true deference is essentially obviated, and in any case, no clear 
and reasoned standards of subsidiarity are affected. As a result, the power of 
the dispute settlement system to influence and indeed quash measures taken to 
comply is upheld. The middle ground, however, is that the choice of compliance 
measures is yet another field of dialectic deference and negotiated subsidiarity 
discourse between the WTO and its Members, in which a delicate balance is 
maintained—but with significant weight pulled by the dispute settlement system 
in the direction of its powers. 
 
Biotech, 6 WORLD TRADE REV. 215, 215 (2007).  
 87.  DSU art. 19.4.  
 88.  See Julien Chaisse, Deconstructing the WTO Conformity Obligation: A Theory of Compliance 
as Process, 38 FORDHAM J. INT’L L. 57, 94 (2015). 
 89.  See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Zeroing, ¶¶ 384–394 (“[A]s the 
right to make a suggestion is discretionary, a panel declining a request for such a suggestion does not 
act contrary to . . .  the DSU.”).   
 90.  See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador, ¶¶ 321–325, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU (adopted Dec. 11, 2008). 
 91.  DSU art. 21.5.  
 92.  Appellate Body Report, EC—Bananas. 
 93.  As seen in Appellate Body Report, US—Shrimp; and discernable in the AB’s reasoning in the 
Appellate Body Report, EC—Seals, at ¶¶ 5.316–.339.  
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One particularly illuminating example of this can be found in the seemingly 
esoteric arbitrations under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU on the “reasonable 
period of time” for compliance.94 Arbitrators in these cases customarily take 
great pains to emphasize that their role is solely to establish the reasonable time 
under the particular circumstances, and not to determine the preferred method 
of compliance.95 However, in reality, the two questions are so intertwined that 
beyond stating that the implementing Member has “a measure of discretion in 
choosing the means of implementation that it deems most appropriate,”96 it is 
practically impossible to consider the formal issue of the implementation period 
without delving into the proposed methods of compliance.97 
D. WTO Dispute Settlement and Its Interaction with Regional Trade 
Agreements 
As a final, brief example of how subsidiarity can be selectively and indeed 
strategically (dis)employed as a discursive device, consider the WTO dispute 
settlement system’s current deliberately oblivious approach to the law and 
procedures of regional trade arrangements. There exist today hundreds of such 
agreements, the laws of which often correspond with WTO rules, necessarily 
creating instances of substantive and procedural overlap.98 If regional trade 
arrangements set out particular rules and procedures (generally acceptable 
under WTO law),99 a vertical subsidiarity-oriented approach would have 
suggested (for reasons of both legitimacy and efficiency) an enhanced deference 
thereto. Yet in several disputes,100 WTO Panels and the AB have demonstrated 
a clear unwillingness to even take regional rules and decisions into account.101 
 
 94.  See Werner Zdouc, The Reasonable Period of Time for Compliance with the Rulings and 
Recommendations adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, in KEY ISSUES IN WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT: THE FIRST TEN YEARS 94 (Rufus Yerxa & Bruce Wilson eds., 2005). 
 95.  See Award of the Arbitrator, United States—Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) 
Requirements, ¶ 68, WTO Doc. WT/DS384/24, WT/DS386/23 (Dec. 4, 2012) (“[My] mandate relates to 
the time by when the implementing Member must achieve compliance, not to the manner in which that 
Member achieves compliance.”).  
 96.  See Award of the Arbitrator, China—Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain 
Oriented Flat-rolled Electrical Steel from the United States, ¶ 3.4, WTO Doc. WT/DS414/12 (May 3, 
2013). 
 97.  Id. ¶ 3.2 (“[T]he means of implementation available to the Member concerned is a relevant 
consideration.”).  
 98.  See Gabrielle Marceau & Julian Wyatt, Dispute Settlement Regimes Intermingled: Regional 
Trade Agreements and the WTO, 1 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 67, 68–73 (2010).  
 99.  See Petros C. Mavroidis, Always Look at the Bright Side of Non-Delivery: WTO and 
Preferential Trade Agreements, Yesterday and Today, 10 WORLD TRADE REV. 375, 377 (2011) 
(discussing Article XXIV GATT and related instruments such as the “transparency mechanism”). 
 100.  See Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS332/AB/R (adopted Dec. 3, 2007); Appellate Body Report, European Communities—
Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain Poultry Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS69/AB/R (adopted 
July 13, 1998).  
 101.  Especially illuminating is the Appellate Body Report, Mexico—Soft Drinks, ¶ 56 (the AB’s 
unwillingness to undertake “a determination whether the United States has acted consistently or 
inconsistently with its NAFTA obligations” reflects its concern over integrating authority); see also 
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Strong rationales certainly exist for eschewing a subsidiarity approach to 
both jurisdiction and applicable law with respect to regional agreements. Parties 
who choose to bring a dispute to the WTO instead of an applicable regional 
agreement may simply be forum-shopping,102 or the WTO might be selected in 
order to influence not only the conduct of the respondent state in a particular 
dispute, but the evolution of the interpretation and application of WTO law 
with respect to a broader set of trading partners.103 In either case, significant 
recourse to regional trade agreement law might indeed be inappropriate from a 
WTO perspective. There are, however, equally compelling reasons to 
proactively incorporate (indeed, co-opt) regional systems into the WTO 
through dispute settlement,104 with subsidiarity and deference as guiding 
principles. Nonetheless, the approach pursued thus far in the WTO has been 
decidedly nondeferential. This likely reflects a marriage of the WTO’s 
insecurity vis-à-vis regionalism with the perception that regional agreements 
(other than the EU) are not a relevant constituency—circumstances that induce 
WTO adjudicators to adopt a policy of benign ignorance toward regional 
systems. It remains to be seen whether this approach will be sustainable over 
time, or whether a more subsidiarity-oriented approach will need to be 
embraced. 
IV 
CONCLUSION: SUBSIDIARITY—A PLAYING FIELD, NOT A PRINCIPLE 
In the WTO, the mechanics of subsidiarity, however implicit and at times 
technical, are amply evident. In spite of this, it cannot be said that there is a 
truly normatively principled or reasoned measure of allocating authority, as 
subsidiarity may aspire to be. In these respects, subsidiarity, as an overarching 
concept, is not very different from the more specific, yet indeterminate, 
substantive and procedural principles that have been identified in this article as 
the stuff subsidiarity and deference are made of, so long as its name is not 
actually spoken—such as, exceptions, standards of review, opt-in and opt-out 
design architecture, standards of review, burdens of proof, and more. 
Subsidiarity is hardly a rule or a principle, unless it is clearly stated as one, with 
clear parameters. It is rather a vernacular, a discursive device of negotiation 
over power and authority among a multiplicity of actors, pulling and pushing in 
different directions. 
 
Tomer Broude, Fragmentation(s) of International Law: Normative Integration as Authority Allocation, 
in SOVEREIGNTY, SUPREMACY, SUBSIDIARITY: THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 99–120 (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds., 2008). 
 102.  Joost Pauwelyn & Luiz Eduardo Salles, Forum Shopping before International Tribunals: (Real) 
Concerns, (Im)Possible Solutions, 42 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 77, 79–85 (2009).  
 103.  Marc L. Busch, Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in 
International Trade, 61 INT’L ORG. 735, 743 (2007). 
 104.  See Henry Gao & Chin Leng Lim, Saving the WTO From the Risk of Irrelevance: The WTO 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism as A ‘Common Good’ for RTA Disputes, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 899, 899–
901 (2008).  
3-BROUDE INCORPORATED (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/2016  1:26 PM 
74 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 79:53 
Moreover, even in this sense—in the WTO and elsewhere105—it is not 
possible to state with any conviction or bona fides that subsidiarity, or 
subsidiarity-like mechanisms, serve a clear vectorial function, whether 
decentralizing or centralizing, centripetal or centrifugal. There is in practice a 
much more nuanced, intricate interplay between subnational, national, regional, 
plurilateral, and multilateral levels of policy and decisionmaking, in which 
applications of subsidiarity are selectively and even strategically employed by 
all involved. As a result, subsidiarity becomes not a trump, as it is sometimes 
conceived, but a field of legal and political deliberation. 
In this arena, the central or higher levels of governance may actually have 
some counterintuitive advantages over the rest. After all, in the WTO but also 
in other areas such as international human rights and investment protection, 
normative indeterminacy goes hand in hand with political complexity. And in 
these areas there is an additional, structural, institutional dimension to be 
considered—the absence of a third-party with both the competence and the 
capacity to determine the allocations of authority, for better or for worse. In the 
EU, with its array of institutions, and in federal systems, courts sometimes serve 
the purpose of drawing lines of power between federal and constituent entities. 
In contrast, in the WTO, the obvious suspect for attracting authority 
centralization is one and the same as the main arbiter of subsidiarity-like 
authority allocation rules—the dispute settlement system. Seen this way, the 
WTO Panels and AB can be likened to a cat guarding the milk. It is, however, a 
cat still dependent on a willingly providing milkman without whom there would 
be nothing to guard—a simple variant of the Hegelian Herrschaft und 
Knechtschaft (Lordship and Bondage) dialectic.106 Indeed, subsidiarity can be 
selective and the deference that comes with it is dialectic, certainly in the WTO, 
but not only so; these are perhaps inherent attributes of the very concept itself. 
 
 
 105.  See, e.g., Jachtenfuchs & Krisch, supra note 2, at 12 & n.47 (referencing Canadian Supreme 
Court jurisprudence).  
 106.  See G.W.G. HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, ch. IV.A (J.B. Baillie, trans.) (1910).   
